Abstract-Cooperative (or distributed) sensing has been recognized as a viable means to enhance the incumbent signal detection by exploiting the diversity of sensors. However, it is challenging to secure such distributed sensing due mainly to the unique features of dynamic spectrum access networks-openness of low-layer protocol stacks in software-defined radio devices and the absence of interactions/coordination between primary and secondary devices. To meet this challenge, we propose an attack-tolerant distributed sensing protocol (ADSP) for DTV signal detection in IEEE 802.22 WRANs, under which sensors in close proximity are grouped as a cluster, and sensors within a cluster cooperate to safeguard the integrity of sensing. The heart of ADSP is a novel filter based on shadow-fading correlation, by which the fusion center cross-validates reports from the sensors to identify and penalize abnormal sensing reports. By realizing this correlation filter, ADSP significantly reduces the impact of an attack on the performance of distributed sensing, while incurring minimal processing and communication overheads. ADSP also guarantees the detectability requirements of 802.22 to be met even with the presence of sensing report manipulation attacks by scheduling sensing within the framework of sequential hypothesis testing. The efficacy of ADSP is validated on a realistic 2D shadow-fading field. Our extensive simulation-based study shows that ADSP reduces the false-alarm rate by 99.2 percent while achieving 97.4 percent of maximum achievable detection rate, and meets the detection requirements of IEEE 802.22 in various attack scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
A CCURATE sensing of spectrum condition is key to the opportunistic use of licensed spectrum bands in dynamic spectrum access (DSA) networks, thus mitigating the anticipated spectrum-scarcity problem. The goal of spectrum sensing is to accurately and reliably detect, in real time, the presence or absence of primary signals on a spectrum band. To achieve this goal, numerous sensing techniques and algorithms have been proposed, including physical-layer signal detection [2] , [3] , MAC-layer sensing scheduling and sensor selection [4] , sensor mobility [5] , and associated performance trade-offs [6] , to name a few. 1 In particular, cooperative sensing [7] , [8] has recently received considerable attention as a viable means to enhance the detection performance by exploiting spatial diversity in received signal strengths (RSSs) at spectrum sensors. However, reports from sensors can be manipulated by attackers in various ways, such as primary signal emulation [9] , [10] and sensing results falsification [11] . These sensing-targeted attacks can severely undermine incumbent detection performance because the fusion rule for a final detection decision relies solely on reported RSSs.
Sensing-targeted attacks pose a significant threat as they can disrupt opportunistic spectrum access, the basic premise of DSA. We call these unique sensing-targeted attacks in DSA networks sensing-disorder attacks.
A sensing-disorder attack aims to obscure the existence/ absence of a primary signal by manipulating spectrum sensing information (e.g., measured RSSs) either by raising or lowering the signal strength. When no primary signal exists, attackers or compromised sensors can manipulate their reports (i.e., RSSs) to generate an illusion of a primary signal. For example, in the IEEE 802.22 wireless regional area networks (WRANs) [12] , an attacker can report a fake sensing report to force all users in the entire cell (of radius up to 100 km) to immediately vacate the channel [13] . Once users in the cell vacate the channel, the attacker can freely use the channel without any interruption. When there is a primary signal, on the other hand, attackers can lower the RSSs to veil the presence of a primary signal, leading to an unacceptable level of interference to the primary users. In both cases, attackers mislead the fusion center, i.e., base station (BS), to make an incorrect decision on the presence/ absence of a primary signal, wasting spectrum resources or causing unacceptable interference to the primary communications. Therefore, there is a clear incentive for attackers to launch sensing-disorder attacks.
While sensing-disorder attacks can be easily launched with the aid of programmable software-defined radio (SDR) devices, their detection is difficult. Unlike the ordinary Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that exhaust all the network resources, they can be easily mounted by using SDR devices, such as USRP [14] and Sora [15] . These opensource SDR platforms can be an attractive target for attackers because of their accessibility to low-layer protocol stacks like PHY and MAC [16] . Detecting these attacks, 1 . In this paper, we use the terms secondary user and sensor interchangeably as we focus on the secondary users' role as spectrum sensors.
however, is not an easy task. While secure mechanisms such as MAC-layer or crypto-based authentication work well in traditional wireless networks, lack of primary-secondary communications precludes their usage. Moreover, the detection of attacks is exacerbated by the volatile nature of wireless medium itself, which makes it hard to differentiate between legitimate and deliberately manipulated sensing reports. We thus need to devise a mechanism that can protect cooperative sensing from the abovementioned attacks.
In this paper, we propose an attack-tolerant cooperative sensing protocol for the IEEE 802. 22 WRANs that filters out abnormal sensing reports (caused by either adversaries or malfunctioning sensors) by exploiting shadow-fading correlation in RSSs. This RSS-based filtering is motivated by the fact that attackers cannot control the physical-layer signal propagation.
This paper makes several main contributions as follows:
. Proposal of a novel correlation filter for detection of abnormal sensing reports that 1) exploits shadowfading correlation in RSSs without any additional communication, 2) safeguards spectrum sensing against attacks that increase either the incumbent false-alarm (type-1) or misdetection (type-2) rates, and 3) minimizes processing and sensing overheads. Despite their importance, type-2 attacks have not been considered before. . Introduction of cluster-based cooperative sensing to exploit shadowing correlation. Correlation between sensors, which is entailed by sensor clustering, is known to have a detrimental impact on incumbent detection performance [7] , [8] , [17] . Our evaluation study, however, shows that the proposed clustering does not incur any perceivable performance degradation even in a very low SNR environment. Therefore, sensor clustering is an efficient and useful approach to sensing-disorder attacks. . Development of a new data fusion rule tailored to attack-tolerance. Specifically, we propose weighted gain combining (WGC) that adaptively assigns different weights to sensing reports according to their statistical significance based on the normal shadowing profile. As a result, it minimizes the influence of unfiltered attacks (due to their small deviations) on a final decision, further improving attack tolerance. . Design of a sensing scheduling scheme that guarantees satisfaction of the detection requirements of 802.22 even in the presence of attacks, while minimizing the number of sensing rounds. Although ADSP significantly improves attack tolerance, our simulation results indicate that the detection requirements of 802.22 may not be satisfied with onetime sensing. To solve this problem, we propose an optimal stopping time for sensing scheduling using sequential hypothesis testing so as to meet detectability requirements. . In-depth evaluation of ADSP in a realistic 2D shadow fading environments in IEEE 802.22 WRANs. Most previous work uses a simple but inaccurate 1D model. Our simulation results show that the proposed filtering scheme successfully withstands attacks by reducing the false-alarm rate up to 99.2 percent and achieving up to 97.4 percent of maximum achievable detection rate. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the system and attack models used in this paper. Section 3 presents our proposed approach for attack detection, and the generation of a realistic 2D shadowing field. Section 4 details our approaches to filter design and data fusion, and Section 5 proposes a sensing scheduling algorithm. Section 6 evaluates the performance of ADSP and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Work
The problem of ensuring robustness in distributed sensing has been studied in [11] , [18] , and [19] . Chen et al. [11] proposed a robust data-fusion scheme that dynamically adjusts the reputation of sensors based on the majority rule. Similarly, in the IEEE 802.22 standard draft, a voting rule [19] has been proposed for secure decision fusion. Kaligineedi et al. [18] presented a prefiltering scheme based on a simple outlier method that filters out extremely low or high sensor reports. However, their method may not suitable for a very low SNR environment such as 802. 22 WRANs where a final data-fusion decision is very sensitive to small deviations in RSSs. The defense against Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA) has also been studied in [9] and [10] . Chen et al. [9] proposed an RSS-based location verification scheme to detect a fake primary transmitter. This scheme, however, requires the deployment of a dense sensor network for estimating the location of a signal source, and thus, incurs high system overhead. Anand et al. [10] analyzed the feasibility of PUEA and presented a lower-bound on the probability of a successful PUEA. However, they did not address the impact of PUEA on the performance of cooperative sensing.
The problem of enforcing/enticing secondary users to observe spectrum etiquette has also been studied. Woyach et al. [20] studied how to entice secondary users to observe spectrum etiquette by giving them incentives. In a similar context, Liu et al. [21] studied the problem of detecting unauthorized use of a licensed spectrum. They exploited the path-loss effect as a main criterion for detecting anomalous spectrum usage and presented a machine-learning approach for more general cases. In contrast, we focus on intelligent filtering of suspicious sensor reports.
In a broader context, our paper is related to work on secure data aggregation [22] , [23] , [24] and insider attack detection [25] in wireless sensor networks. However, the problem we consider differs in that it focuses on an important, realistic case where attackers manipulate sensor reports to mislead the fusion center in making a final decision on detection of a primary signal.
SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
We first describe the IEEE 802.22 WRANs and the signal propagation and sensing models to be used throughout the paper. We then introduce the data-fusion model, and finally, present the attack model.
IEEE 802.22 WRANs
We consider an IEEE 802.22 WRAN, an infrastructure-based cellular system where each cell consists of a BS and the associated end users called consumer premise equipments (CPEs). The CPEs represent households in a rural area, and are thus stationary. The typical coverage of each 802.22 cell is 33 km (up to 100 km). The main goal of IEEE 802. 22 WRANs is to provide broadband wireless access in rural areas by allowing opportunistic access of TV white spaces recently opened up by the FCC [26] . The BS, which we assume adversaries cannot compromise, schedules the sensing of channels and decides on the presence/absence of a primary signal in each channel, based on sensing reports from a set C of collaborating sensors. Among different types of primary users in TV bands, we focus on detecting DTV signals with 6 MHz channel bandwidth in the US. We consider an 802.22 cell located at the edge of the keep-outradius (i.e., 150.3 km) of a TV transmitter, and the entire secondary network (or cell) lies within the detection range of the DTV signal.
Signal Propagation and Sensing Models
The received primary (DTV) signal strength at sensor (CPE) i can be expressed as the propagation model [27] 
where P o is the signal strength at the primary transmitter, the path-loss exponent, d o the reference distance, and d i the distance from the primary transmitter to the sensor i. Shadow fading is accounted for in e X i where X i $ N ð0; 2 Þ 8i. The log-normal shadow fading is often characterized by its dB-spread, dB , which has the relationship ¼ 0:1 log e ð10Þ dB . We assume the energy detector for PHYlayer sensing, which measures the power level over the wide 6 MHz-wide DTV channel, the effect of multipath fading can be ignored [2] , [3] as is commonly assumed in the literature [4] , [21] . 2 The energy detector is widely used for its simple design and efficiency [2] , [29] . Although the feature detector is more reliable, it takes much longer (e.g., 24 ms for the fieldsync detector for ATSC) [3] because it looks for a specific signature of the primary signal that appears infrequently. The test statistic of the energy detector is an estimate of average RSS (including the noise power), and can be approximated as a Gaussian using the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) as [12] 
H 0 ðno primary signalÞ;
; H 1 ðprimary signal existsÞ;
where P i is the received power of a primary signal, N o the noise power, and M the number of signal samples. We assume that sensors measure the entire 6 MHz DTV channel at the Nyquist rate for 1 ms, i.e., M ¼ 6 Â 10 3 .
Data-Fusion Model
We consider data fusion as the rule for incumbent detection. While decision fusion reduces the overhead in reporting sensing results, it is difficult to thwart sensing-disorder attacks, since it only provides a binary value based on a local decision.
In fading channels, equal gain combining (EGC) is known to have near-optimal performance without requiring estimation of the channel gains. EGC has the following decision statistic
where T i is the test statistic of the energy detector at sensor i, N s is the number of collaborating sensors, and the sensors have an identical weight, i.e., w i ¼ 1 8i. The decision threshold to achieve the desired level of false-alarm probability Q Ã F A can be derived as [29] ¼
where QðÁÞ is the well-known Q-function. The performance of EGC will be used as a baseline in evaluating the efficacy of the proposed scheme. In order to achieve better attack tolerance, we propose weighted gain combining in ADSP that adjusts the weights fw i g i2C so as to minimize the impact of attack misdetection on the final decision.
Attack Model

Attack Scenarios and Types
Sensing can be disrupted as follows:
. A sensor is compromised, and then manipulates its sensing reports, i.e., raises or lowers RSSs. . A sensor is malfunctioning or faulty, yielding readings that differ from the actual RSS. A common consequence of the above two cases is that the sensing reports to the fusion center are distorted, thus increasing the probability that the fusion center will make a wrong decision. To solve this problem efficiently, we focus on the detection of any abnormal sensing reports instead of pinpointing the actual cause of abnormality.
Note that another possible attack scenario is a PUEA, as studied in [9] , [10] , and [21] . However, PUEA is relatively easy to detect mainly because the attacker has only a coarsegrained control of RSSs at sensors since signals are broadcast. In the above two scenarios, however, the attacker has a fine-grained control of RSSs at individual sensors, making their detection more difficult. Therefore, we will focus on the above two attack scenarios.
We consider two types of attacks that can be mounted (caused) by attackers (faulty nodes):
. Type-1 Attacks increase the false-positive rate (classifying a nonprimary signal or no signal as a primary signal) by raising RSSs, and . Type-2 Attacks increase the false-negative rate (causing failure to detect a primary signal) by lowering RSSs. We assume that the attackers know the presence/ absence of a primary signal regardless of the decision made by the fusion center, and launch type-1 (type-2) attacks under H 0 (H 1 ); otherwise, attacks only serve to improve the incumbent detection performance.
Sensing Reports in the Presence of Attacks
Under the above model, a final sensing report to the fusion center can be expressed (in Watt) as:
where 1 fÁg is an indicator function, T i is the test statistic of the energy detector (in (2)) including the measurement error E i , and D i 2 IR is the deviation or attack strength, tampered with a compromised (or faulty) sensor;
Note that no loss of reporting packets is assumed, so we can focus on the detection of abnormal sensing reports.
THE PROPOSED APPROACH
We now present the design rationale behind ADSP, its framework, and the methodology to generate a spatially correlated shadow fading field.
Design Rationale
To maximize attack tolerance and preserve the detection accuracy of data fusion, ADSP employs anomaly detection based on statistics. Specifically, ADSP exploits physical-layer signal propagation characteristics, or the spatial correlation in RSSs among neighboring sensors. The key insight behind ADSP is that, in shadow fading environments, RSSs at nearby sensors are likely to be highly correlated, which can be used to identify manipulated sensing reports. The adversaries must be aggressive in raising or lowering the RSSs reported to the fusion center in order to influence the outcome of the final decision. However, any sensing report that significantly deviates from what is expected is deemed suspicious of being compromised or erroneous, and will hence be discarded or penalized by the fusion center in making a final decision. Adversaries must, therefore, lower their attack strength, reducing the chance for the fusion center to make a wrong decision; otherwise, they must risk getting caught by the detector. This way, the fusion center can achieve a high level of attack tolerance, provided the majority of its neighbors are well behaving.
ADSP Framework
ADSP resides at the fusion center (i.e., BS) and consists of the following three building blocks:
. Sensing manager that manages sensor clusters and directs the sensors to report their readings at the end of each scheduled sensing period. . Attack detector that detects and discards (or penalizes) abnormal sensing reports based on the pre-established shadowing correlation profile. . Decision maker that determines the presence or absence of a primary signal based on filtered sensing results using sequential hypothesis testing. These three components closely interact with each other and form a robust distributed sensing system. Fig. 1 depicts the ADSP framework, which can be implemented at the 802.22 BS without requiring any modification to sensors (i.e., CPEs).
One important and unique feature of the attack detector is the ability to tolerate both type-1 and type-2 attacks. This feature is attributed to the fact that the detector cross-checks the sensing reports and the assumption that the majority of the sensors are well behaving. As a result, under type-1(2) attacks, the sensing reports with relatively high (low) values are likely to be flagged by more neighboring sensors, thus making our scheme applicable regardless of the existence of a primary signal. This makes the system design simple and efficient, while achieving high attack tolerance.
Generation of Spatially Correlated Shadow Fading
To incorporate spatially correlated shadow fading in our analysis and simulation, we need a shadowing correlation model in which the statistics accurately reflect the realworld wireless shadowing environment. Note that one must rely on a model-based approach since measurement data for shadow fading is very scarce, and conducting a field test is too expensive. Gudmundson's model [30] is one of the most widely used models in accounting for shadowing correlation. However, it cannot capture spatial shadowing correlation, and hence, analyses based on this model might yield results that are significantly different from those in real-world wireless environments, as evidenced in both the theoretical study in [31] and empirical measurements in [32] . Recently, the authors of [33] proposed a statistical modeling approach to characterization of spatial spectrum behavior of primary signals in the context of DSA networks. Along the same line as in [33] , we generate spatially correlated shadow fading in a 2D area by applying the convolution method proposed in [34] . We refer to the thusgenerated data set as a shadowing random field p where pðx; yÞ represents the shadowing gain at a unit grid area, i.e., Á m Â Á m, centered at the coordinate ðx; yÞ 2 IR 2 . The shadowing random field pðÁ; ÁÞ is assumed to be an isotropic, 3 wide-sense stationary, and log normally distributed random field with zero mean and exponentially decaying spatial correlation. Then, the covariance between the two points i ¼ ðx i ; y i Þ and j ¼ ðx j ; y j Þ in p is given as
where d ij ¼ kpð i Þ À pð j Þk is the euclidean distance between the locations i and j , is the standard deviation of shadow fading, and D corr is the decorrelation distance, which depends on local wireless environments (e.g., urban or suburban). 4 Fig . 2a shows an example of a shadowing random field in a 2 km Â 2 km region, which clearly exhibits a strong spatial correlation in shadow fading. This is clearly shown in Fig. 2b , which depicts the 2D autocorrelation of shadow fading. To demonstrate the accuracy of this method, Fig. 2c compares the 1D autocorrelation function () of a random field against the Gudmundson's empirical model with dB ¼ 4:5 dB and D corr ¼ 150 m. The figure indicates that the synthetic data in the shadowing random field accurately emulates real-world shadowing correlations. Note that our attack detection scheme in ADSP only requires the 1D autocorrelation function of the shadowing field, which can be estimated by the service provider at the time of system deployment.
DETECTION OF ABNORMAL SENSOR REPORTS VIA CORRELATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we formulate the anomaly detection problem as a hypothesis testing, and present the design of a correlation-based filter. To further improve the attack tolerance of ADSP, we propose a new data-fusion rule, called the weighted gain combining. For cooperative sensing, the designated sensors (grouped in clusters) report their energy-detector's output along with their location information to the fusion center, at the end of each sensing period. 5 The location information is required to exploit the shadowing correlation in RSSs; it may be available at the fusion center since the sensors (i.e., CPEs) in 802.22 are stationary and 802.22 standard draft mandates the BS to have sensors' location information. Sensors can employ existing secure localization protocols (e.g., [36] , [37] ) to obtain accurate sensor location information.
Characterization of the Correlation in Sensing Reports
We first study the correlation structure of the sensing reports. A key observation is that the correlation structure of shadowing components fe X i g is preserved in the sensing reports fR i g when there is no attack (or misbehavior), i.e., D i ¼ 0. To simplify the analysis, we further assume that the variance of the measurement error can be approximated as
M regardless of the presence/absence of a primary signal. 6 Under the above conditions, and treating all the other terms in (1) (except e X i and E i ) as constants, we can express sensor i's report in (5) as
where
M Þ is the measurement error of the energy detector. The correlation in shadowing component e Xi does not change when we add/multiply the same number to all of the shadowing components.
Moreover, the variance of measurement error is much smaller than that of a shadowing component, i.e., 2 E < 2 X , since the number of samples M is sufficiently large even with a short sensing time, e.g., M ¼ 6 Â 10 3 for the duration of 1 ms. So, the correlation in the received sensing reports 3. Note that we do not consider angular dependency in shadowing correlation for analytical tractability.
4. The measurement study in [35] indicates that a typical decorrelation distance is in the range of 120-200 m in suburban areas.
5. We consider 2D sensor coordinates for simplicity, while the actual terrain profile is 3D.
6. This assumption is reasonable in a very low SNR environment, e.g., À20 dB, where the average primary signal power is only about 1 percent of the noise power, i.e., IE½P i ¼ 0:01 Â IE½N o . fR i g almost preserves the correlation of the shadow fading e Xi , i.e., CorrðR i ; R j Þ % Corrðe Xi ; e Xj Þ.
Cluster-Based Hypothesis Testing
While we exploit shadowing correlation for attack detection, the degree of correlation decreases exponentially with the distance between sensors. Therefore, we form sensor clusters among the sensors in close proximity, such that sensors within the same cluster are highly correlated. A measurement study in [38] indicates that households in rural areas tend to be clustered, and thus, it is reasonable to assume that a BS can identify several sensor (i.e., CPE) clusters within its own cell of typical radius of 33 km. If such sensor clusters exist, the BS can easily identify them based on their location information. If such sensor clusters do not exist, additional sensors can be deployed to form such sensor clusters. Therefore, for each collaborative sensor i 2 C, the correlation filter checks if the sensor exhibits proper correlation behavior based on the following hypothesis testing for each of its neighbors within the cluster
where the neighbor set NðiÞ is defined as the sensors belonging to the same cluster of sensor i. As a result of this cross checking, the number of flags raised by neighboring sensors will be used as a filtering criterion (see Section 5.3 for details). We will henceforth focus on the analysis of shadowing correlation in sensing reports.
Correlation Analysis for Filter Design
Although the shadowing correlation coefficient ðÞ is an obvious metric for the above hypothesis testing (i.e., (8)), it is not suitable for direct use in our problem because estimation of the correlation coefficient would require a sequence of samples; this can incur significant time and energy overhead for sensing, and can also deter the detection of returning primary users. Therefore, we detect per sample abnormal behavior by examining sensing reports' similarity using the conditional probability distributions of sensing reports. This is an alternative, but efficient approach since higher correlation entails greater similarity, which can be measured via a conditional distribution of sensor reports, as we will describe next. In order to capture the similarity between sensing reports, we first derive the probability distribution of R i , which is the sum of nonzero mean normal (i.e., E i ) and lognormal (i.e., e X i ) random variables, as indicated in (7) . To the best of our knowledge, there is no closed-form expression for such a distribution. However, a close examination of (7) implies that R i can be approximated as a shifted log-normal random variable, i.e., the sum of a lognormal random variable and a constant.
Let us denote the sensing reports by a shifted log-normal random variable, i.e.,
From (7), we have the following approximation after simple manipulation:
so that the probability of the right-hand side of (9) becomes less than C is close to zero (i.e., % 3 Â 10 À5 ). This is important to preserve the non-negativeness of the log-normal random variable e Zi . Then, we estimate the mean and variance of e Zi using a moment-matching method. By matching the mean and variance of both sides of (9), we havê
The derivations of (10) and (11) are straightforward, and thus omitted due to space limitation. Fig. 3 shows an example of such approximation. While the figure indicates that the sensing reports can be accurately estimated by such a distribution, it becomes less accurate as the sensing duration T S increases. Note, however, that we want to capture the correlation among sensors in a tractable form, not necessarily as an accurate approximation that only complicates the analysis without yielding a noticeable improvement in detection performance. The impact of the approximation error will be discussed in Section 6.
Based on (9), (10), and (11), the p.d.f. of a sensor report can be expressed as
Recall that we are interested in studying the similarity of sensing reports measured at nearby (thus spatially correlated) sensors. To measure the similarity between sensing reports, we derive the conditional p.d.f. of sensor i's report R i given the neighboring sensor j's report R j ¼ r j using (12) as where
Equation (15) indicates that standard deviation Z i jZ j decreases as the correlation ij increases, and thus greater similarity exists between sensing reports. Equations (13), (14), and (15) indicate that the conditional distribution of sensing reports is also log normally distributed. We thus set the lower and upper thresholds on the sensing reports based on the conditional p.d.f. in (13) , and then mark any outlier that resides outside of the thresholds. To set the thresholds, we first derive the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of sensor i's report r i , given sensor j's report r j as
Using (16), the thresholds T H fL;Ug with a 100 Â ð1 À Þ% confidence interval can be derived as
where Z i jZ j and Z i jZ j are the conditional mean and standard deviation in (14) and (15), respectively. Therefore, the null hypothesis H a 0 , i.e., CorrðR i ; R j Þ ¼ ðd ij Þ, cannot be rejected if r i 2 ½T H L ; T H U , as depicted in Fig. 4 , whereas the attack false-alarm probability can be calculated as P a F A ¼ P rðr i < TH L Þ þ P rðr i > TH U Þ. Note that the thresholds are set differently for neighboring sensors, depending on their relative distance and measured RSSs.
Clearly, there is a trade-off in determining the threshold parameter , i.e., the higher the threshold, the higher (lower) the false-alarm (misdetection) rate for attack detection. The impact of the thresholds on incumbent detection performance will be studied in Section 6.
The Proposed Data-Fusion Rule
While the correlation filter accurately detects RSS deviations in sensing reports, we observed that it often misdetects small deviations (e.g., 0:3 dB). These small deviations can still influence the data-fusion results in a very low SNR environment due to the high sensitivity of the fusion decision to RSSs. Therefore, as a second line of defense, we propose a new data-fusion rule, namely weighted gain combining, to provide a better attack tolerance to such small deviations. The idea is to assign different weights to the sensing reports according to their significance level based on the conditional c.d.f. in (16) . This way, the misdetected (unfiltered) attacks are highly likely to be assigned relatively small weights compared to legitimate sensing reports because of their lack of significance. Thus, the weights in WGC are defined as
where N v ðiÞ is the set of valid neighbors of sensor i whose reports passed the filter. The thus-obtained weights are used in calculating the decision statistic.
The simulation results (in Section 6) show that the WGC for data-fusion significantly reduces the attack false-alarm and mis-detection probabilities. However, the results also indicate that the detectability requirement of 802.22, i.e., Q F A ; Q MD 0:1, might not be met under weak attack strengths (e.g., 0:3 dB) as they cannot be easily differentiated from the normal sensing reports. To remedy this and to meet the detectability requirements of 802.22 regardless of attack strengths, we next present sequential hypothesis testing framework for sensing scheduling.
THE PROPOSED DATA-FUSION RULE VIA SEQUENTIAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In this section, we first formulate the incumbent detection problem as a sequential hypothesis testing, subject to the detection requirements of 802.22. We then provide a description of ADSP.
Attack-Tolerant Sensing Scheduling via Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)
In ADSP, the BS schedules the sensing periods (stages) until it obtains a sufficient amount of information for making a final decision. Thus, the BS receives a sequence of measured test statistics from the sensors. This makes sequential detection suitable for our problem. In particular, among various sequential detection techniques, we adopt Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Test [39] since it is optimal in the sense of minimizing the average number of observations, given bounded false-alarm probability Q F A and misdetection probability Q MD . Therefore, by adopting the SPRT along with WGC, the BS can meet the detection requirement of 802.22 under the existence of malicious sensors by carefully designing the decision statistic as we discuss next.
Design of Decision Statistic
For SPRT, the distributions of the weighted test statistics of the sensors that passed the filter should be available to the BS under both hypotheses. In practice, however, it is not feasible to derive a closed-form expression for such distributions. Therefore, instead of relying on the exact distributions of T AE , we exploit the threshold property of T AE as our main decision criterion. Let # n denote a Bernoulli random variable defined as
where T AE;n is the sum of test statistics from the valid sensors, i.e., those who passed the filter, in sensing stage n, and n is the decision threshold, which depends on the number of valid sensing reports and the desired false-alarm probability Q Ã F A (see (4) in Section 2). Our detection problem is thus a binary Gaussian classification problem where the observed test statistic # n 8n belongs to one of two classes, H 0 or H 1 , where
When there is no attack, the random variables 0 and 1 can be defined as
In this case, there should be a significant difference between 0 and 1 , i.e., 1 ) 0 . 7 However, the actual achievable Q F A and Q D under attack scenarios can be higher and lower than the desired values, respectively, due to performance deficiency of the filter. For example, Fig. 8 in Section 6 indicates that 1 À 0 can be as low as 0.08 under weak attacks, thus rendering it difficult for the BS to make a correct decision.
Therefore, 0 and 1 are the key parameters in our design of SPRT, which must be carefully set so as to meet the detection requirements of 802.22 under various attack scenarios. Thus, we set
where " 0 ; " 1 2 IR with the constraint 
Optimal Stopping Rule for Sensing Scheduling
In SPRT, a decision is made based on the observed sequence of test statistics, f# n g N n¼1 , using the following rule: where A and B (0 < A < B < 1) are the detection thresholds that depend on the desired values of Q F A and Q MD . The decision statistic Ã N is the log-likelihood ratio based on N sequential observations (i.e., test statistics) # 1 ; . . . ; # N as
Assuming that f# n g N n¼1 are i.i.d., (24) becomes
Equation (25) can be rewritten as
where s N ¼ P N n¼1 1 f# n ¼1g denotes the number of sensing stages n where # n ¼ 1.
Performance Analysis
We now quantify the performance of our SPRT-based sensing scheduling in terms of 1) detection performance, i.e., Q F A and Q MD , and 2) average number of sensing rounds needed to meet the detectability requirements.
In SPRT, the desired detection performance can be guaranteed by setting the decision thresholds A and B as follows: let a Ã and b Ã denote the desired values of Q F A and Q MD , respectively. Then, the decision boundaries A and B are given by [39] A ¼ ln b
and the actual achievable error probabilities, denoted as a and b can only be slightly larger than the desired values a Ã and b Ã . Recall that our objective is to meet the detection requirements of 802.22 even in the presence of malicious/ mal-functioning sensors. Thus, we aim to minimize the number of times the spectrum needs to be sensed, with the decision thresholds derived from the target detection probabilities as shown in (27) . Therefore, we are interested in analyzing the number of sensing rounds until a decision is made (i.e., either the boundary A or B is reached).
The average number of sensing rounds (also called quiet periods in 802.22) required to make a decision, denoted by IE½N, can be computed as
First, using (26) , the average value of under both hypotheses can be derived as
Next, the average of Ã N can be found as follows: suppose H 0 holds, then Ã N will reach B (i.e., false alarm) with the desired false-alarm probability a Ã ; otherwise, it will reach A. Thus, using (27), we get 7 . For example, the detection requirement of 802.22
Based on (28), (29) , and (30), we can derive the average number of required sensing rounds for decision making as
Similarly, we can derive IE½NjH 1 .
Protocol Description
We now present the attack-tolerant distributed sensing protocol with the proposed WGC for final fusion. Algorithm 1 describes the overall data-fusion procedure in ADSP. At the end of each sensing period, the fusion center collects sensing reports fR i g from the collaborating sensors, which are collocated in clusters. Then, the fusion center activates the correlation filter to selectively discard abnormal sensing reports and updates the decision statistic Ã n based on the remaining sensing reports with their weights. Note that the weights are assigned after the filtering process (line 11) so that the filtered abnormal sensing reports have no influence on them. The fusion center repeats this process until the decision statistic reaches one of the predefined thresholds, i.e., A and B.
Algorithm 1. ATTACK-TOLERANT DISTRIBUTED SENSING WITH WEIGHTED GAIN COMBINING
Procedure ADSP_WGC(fR i g; Q F A ; ) 1: while each sensing round n do 2: T AE;n 0 /* Decision statistic */ 3:
N normal 0 /* Number of normal sensing reports */ // Step 1. Check (ab)normality of sensing reports 4: for each sensor cluster S k k ¼ 1; . . . ; N c do 5:
for each sensor i 2 S k do 6:
ðIsnormalðiÞ; w i Þ CorrFilterði; fR j g j2NðiÞ ; Þ 7: end for 8: end for // Step 2. Update decision statistic 9: for each sensor cluster S k k ¼ 1; . . . ; N c do 10:
for each sensor i 2 S k do 11:
if IsnormalðiÞ ¼¼ 1 then 12:
Update w i using (19) 13:
end for 17: end for 18: T AE;n T AE;n Â N normal = P w i /* Normalization */ 19: Calculate the decision threshold n using (4) 20: if T AE;n > n then 21: return 1 /* Primary exists */ 27: else if Ã n < A then
28:
return 0 /* Primary does not exists */ 29: else 30:
Schedule another sensing round and wait for the observation 31: end if 32: end while Algorithm 2 details the filtering procedure. For each sensing report, the filter counts the number of flags raised by neighbors in the cluster. Then, the filter will return Isnormal ¼ 0 if more than 2 ½0; 1 fraction of the neighboring sensors mark it as abnormal, where is a design parameter; otherwise, it will return Isnormal ¼ 1. The filter also returns the weight vector (w i ) for future use in the final data-fusion process (i.e., WGC). The computational complexity of the algorithm is bounded by Oðm 2 Þ where m is the number of sensors in a cluster. Update w ij using (19) 6:
if CorrðR i ; R j Þ 6 ¼ ðd ij Þ using (17) then 7:
þ þ blacklist counterðiÞ 8:
end if 9: end for 10: if blacklist counterðiÞ > Á NðiÞ then 11:
Isnormal 0 /* Mark it as abnormal */ 12: end if 13: return ðIsnormal; w i Þ Remark. Although the key assumptions we have made, i.e., negligible multipath fading and presence of sensor clusters, are valid for the DTV signal detection in IEEE 802.22 WRANs, they might not always hold, depending on a given DSA environment, thus limiting the practicality of ADSP. For example, multipath fading in sensing reports may be negligible when sensors are mobile, or a primary signal is sensed with narrow channel bandwidth. However, relaxation of such assumptions may require a major modification to ADSP, and thus, extension of ADSP to such challenging environments is left as our future work.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance of ADSP is evaluated via Matlab-based simulations. We first describe the simulation setup and then present the simulation results for both types of attacks under various attack scenarios.
Simulation Setup
To demonstrate the effectiveness of ADSP, we consider an IEEE 802.22 WRAN environment with a single DTV transmitter with 6 MHz bandwidth and multiple sensors (i.e., CPEs) located at the edge of the keep-out radius of 150.3 km from the DTV transmitter [2] . An 802.22 cell of radius 30 km is considered for our evaluation, and we generate a 2D shadowing field (using the method discussed in Section 3.3) with a unit grid of 20 Â 20 m 2 to emulate a realistic shadow fading environment in a cell. Throughout the simulation, we assume five sensor clusters located randomly within the cell, with six sensors in each cluster; the sensors are located in different grids, and the distances between sensors within a Fig. 5 . We consider the attack scenario where one-third of the sensors are malicious in each cluster. Table 1 lists the system parameters used in our simulation. Each simulation is run on 5 Â 10 4 randomly generated shadowing fields, and their average values are taken as the performance measures.
Impact of Sensor Clustering
While ADSP exploits shadowing correlation via sensor clustering, correlated sensor readings are, in general, known to degrade detection performance as they limit diversity gain [7] , [8] , [17] . Therefore, we first study the effect of sensor clustering on detection performance to understand the efficiency versus robustness trade-off in ADSP. Fig. 6 compares the achieved incumbent detection probabilities (Q D ) with and without sensor clustering (i.e., sensors are randomly selected by the BS). As expected, cooperative sensing without clustering yields higher detection probability than with sensor clustering with À20 dB SNR. However, the performance gap decreases as more sensors are involved in cooperative sensing, e.g., sensing with five clusters achieves 94 percent of that without clustering. Note that this performance with clustering gets even closer to that of random selection as the SNR increases. Therefore, we can conclude that sensor clustering is not critical to incumbent detection, while it provides an efficient means of attack detection.
Attack Detection Performance
As a first line of defense, the attack detector in ADSP must be able to correctly identify any abnormal sensors within each cluster and discard their reports before making a final decision. Fig. 7 shows the performance of our correlationbased filter under both types of attacks. The lower and upper thresholds (i.e., T H fL;Ug ) for the correlation filter are set using (17) with a 99 percent confidence interval, i.e., ¼ 0:01. The figures indicate that the attack detection rate, i.e., probability that a manipulated sensing report will be correctly filtered, increases with attack strength under both attack types. This is because the larger the deviation from the normal profile, the easier to identify them. However, the attack false-alarm rate also increases with attack strength because normal sensing reports will be mistakenly flagged more frequently by the manipulated sensing reports, and as a result, normal sensing reports will be classified as attacks more frequently. The figures show that ADSP performs well against both types of attacks.
Attack-Tolerance for One-Time Sensing
We now demonstrate the robustness of ADSP to both type-1 and type-2 attacks for one-time sensing. Fig. 8 plots the incumbent false-alarm (Q F A ) and detection (Q D ) probabilities under type-1 and type-2 attacks, respectively. Note that Q F A and Q D are normalized with respect to the maximum achievable values in the absence of attacks. The figure shows that the correlation filter is efficient in mitigating the effect of attacks on incumbent detection performance, e.g., 99.2 percent for type-1 and 97.4 percent for type-2 attacks, thanks to its ability to accurately filter out manipulated sensing reports. By contrast, without ADSP (denoted by EGC in Fig. 8 ), Q F A and Q D rapidly converge to 1 and 0, respectively, as attack strength increases, i.e., attacks have maximal influence on the data-fusion results.
We make the following four main observations. First, the performance of ADSP suffers in cases of low attack strength (e.g., <0:4 dB for type-1 attack). This is because they do not exhibit deviations significant enough to be detected (thus causing underfiltering), yet they affect data-fusion decisions. The proposed weighted gain combining mitigates this performance deficiency for both types of attacks by adaptively adjusting sensing reports' weights based on their statistical significance. However, WGC performs as well as, or even worse than, EGC when the attack strength is either 1) extremely low so that most attacks will not be filtered out or 2) large enough so that most (or all) attacks are filtered out, as can be seen in Fig. 8 with ¼ 0:01. This is because, in the first case, the unfiltered attacks will decrease the weights of the legitimate sensing reports, while sharing large weights among themselves. On the other hand, in the second case, the legitimate sensing reports with extreme values are likely to be assigned small weights despite their critical role in accurate detection of incumbents.
Second, ADSP outperforms the statistics-based filtering method proposed in [18] (denoted by Outlier in Fig. 8 ). In outlier, the fusion center filters out the sensing reports outside the range ½e 1 À Á e iqr ; e 3 þ Á e iqr where e 1 and e 3 represent the first and third quartile of the samples, respectively, and e iqr ¼ e 3 À e 1 is the interquartile range (see (4) in [18] ). This method does not require sensor clustering, and thus, one might think that it performs well when attack strength is strong enough to be easily detected as an outlier. However, the performance depends strongly on the filtering range, i.e., the choice of , the result of which varies with attack scenarios. For example, when ¼ 0:7, performance suffers from overfiltering with a high attack misdetection rate. On the other hand, when ¼ 1, performance suffers from underfiltering, and as a result, Q F A and Q D converge to 1 and 0, respectively, even in the case of high attack strength. In contrast, ADSP accurately detects manipulated sensing reports by considering shadowing correlation.
Third, even in the case of high attack strength, ADSP does not completely eliminate the effects of attacks for the following reasons. First, the fixed threshold parameter does not work optimally for all attack strengths, thus causing either over-or underfiltering, both of which degrade detection performance. The overfiltering caused by a large threshold value (e.g., ¼ 0:1) turned out to lower both Q F A and Q D , as shown in Fig. 8 . Second, as a result of filtering, the fusion center will have fewer samples to be used for data fusion. Since data fusion is sensitive to the number of samples used, especially in very low SNR environments (as shown in Fig. 6 ), incumbent detection performance degrades. For example, with 20 sensing reports remaining after filtering out all 10 manipulated sensing reports, the average achievable Q D is 0.88, which corresponds to the normalized Q D of 0.93 in Fig. 8 .
Fourth, in the absence of attacks, the correlation filter incurs a small increase in both Q F A and Q D . This is caused by the inaccuracy in the log-normal approximation of sensing reports, which causes overfiltering even in the case of no attacks. We observed that this performance anomaly can be mitigated by reducing the sensing duration T S (e.g., <1 ms), which makes the approximation more accurate because the distribution of sensing reports more closely resembles a normal distribution.
Trade-Off in Setting the Detection Threshold
We now study the impact of the filtering threshold on attack detection performance. Fig. 9a plots the impact of the filtering threshold on incumbent detection performance. In this simulation, we fixed the attack strength at 0.1 dB for both types of attacks. The figure shows that Q F A monotonically decreases as increases for both fusion rules, implying that filtering out more sensing reports always helps to lower the false-alarm rate of incumbents. For the same reason, however, a large degrades the detection probability Q D . This can be explained by the heavy tail of a log-normal distribution of shadow fading; filtering out high RSSs at the tail lowers the decision statistics significantly, thus reducing the chance of generating false-alarms (or detecting incumbents). Another observation is that WGC Fig. 8 . Attack-tolerance of ADSP: ADSP (a) minimizes the false-alarm probability by up to 99.2 percent for type-1 attacks, and (b) achieves 97.4 percent of maximum achievable detection probability (i.e., with 20 normal sensing reports in 5 clusters) for type-2 attacks.
outperforms EGC for type-2 attacks, thanks to its ability to adjust the weights for sensing reports based on their significance. However, the performance gain decreases as increases. For type-1 attacks, WGC also outperforms EGC in case of under-filtering, e.g., 2 ½0:01; 0:06, as discussed in Section 6.4. Fig. 9b shows the average number of valid sensing reports (i.e., those that passed the filter). It clearly indicates that the filter becomes more aggressive in rejecting sensing reports as increases, thus reducing the number of sensing reports to be used for making a final fusion decision. Therefore, the filter must be carefully designed to make the trade-off between false-alarm and detection probabilities, while considering their dependency on attack strength.
Meeting the IEEE 802.22 Detection Requirements via Sensing Scheduling
Here we evaluate the performance of the sensing scheduling algorithm in ADSP in terms of the number of sensing rounds (i.e., detection delay). Fig. 10 shows the number of sensing rounds needed to meet the detectability requirement of Q F A ; Q MD 0:01, which is below the requirements of IEEE 802.22, i.e., Q F A ; Q MD 0:1. Figs. 10a and 10b plot the mean and standard deviation of the number of sensing rounds. The figures indicate that the average number of sensing rounds is maximized when the attack strength is relatively small, i.e., 0.12 dB, thus confirming the observation made in Fig. 8 . In 802.22, sensing rounds can be scheduled as frequent as once every 10 ms, i.e., one MAC frame size in 802.22. Therefore, Fig. 10 implies that ADSP can meet the incumbent detection timing requirement of 802.22, i.e., the returning primary signal must be detected within 2 seconds, since the maximum required number of sensing rounds remains below five.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
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